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The claim of globalisation critics that the income gap with industrial countries is 
bound to widen for essentially all developing countries as a consequence of economic 
globalisation is in conflict with empirical evidence. Economic performance differs 
tremendously across developing countries. We discuss several factors such as capital 
accumulation, openness to trade, and foreign indebtedness which may explain the varying 
experience with globalisation in regard to per capita income growth and income 
distribution. Economic restructuring is shown to represent an important—though 
frequently neglected—link between globalisation and country-specific performance. We 
conclude that national policy-makers continue to have effective leverage to promote 
economic catching-up and poverty alleviation in the countries they govern. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Listening to globalisation critics, it appears that essentially all countries are 
fighting a losing battle in dealing with economic globalisation. Globalisation is blamed 
for having caused unemployment, wage pressure and social erosion in industrial 
countries. More specifically, the integration of developing and newly industrialising 
countries into the global division of labour is said to result in significant labour market 
pressure in industrial countries. At the same time, many developing countries are 
supposed to be left on the sidelines when it comes to participating in globalisation. The 
few winners of globalisation seem to have gone after various emerging markets were 
hit by severe financial crises since the mid-1990s. 
Obviously, globalisation critics do not care much about consistency in their 
reasoning. How to attribute labour market problems in industrial countries to the 
emergence of new competitors with lower per-capita income, if most developing 
countries remained outsiders and if international income diversity widened across the 
board? The solution to this “puzzle”, suggested in this paper, is that easy 
generalisations are inappropriate for assessing the consequences of globalisation. 
Economic performance differs tremendously, both within the group of industrial 
countries and within the group of developing and emerging economies, even though 
the globalising environment was very much the same for all countries. 
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The relevant question therefore is to identify the factors behind the varying 
experience with globalisation.
1 According to our basic proposition, economic 
restructuring represents the crucial—and often neglected—link between globalisation 
and country-specific performance. As a corollary of this proposition, we reject the 
widely held belief that globalisation renders national policy-makers powerless. 
National policy-makers continue to have effective leverage to promote a process of 
economic catching up and poverty alleviation in the countries they govern. 
 
II.  INTEGRATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GLOBAL 
DIVISION OF LABOUR: SOME STYLISED FACTS 
The generalised claim of globalisation critics that developing countries are left 
on the sidelines is in serious conflict with patterns of international trade and foreign 
direct investment (FDI), which represent the two major driving forces of 
globalisation. It is true, however, that various groups of developing countries 
participated in globalisation to a strikingly different degree. 
All non-OECD countries taken together succeeded in increasingly penetrating 
the markets for manufactured goods in industrial countries. During the 1990s, 
developing countries increased their market share in OECD countries from 18 
percent to 26 percent [OECD (2001)]. Asian developing countries further 
strengthened their market position, and supplied about two thirds of OECD imports 
of manufactured goods from all developing countries in 1999.
2 This development is 
particularly striking, as various protectionist measures (notably non-tariff measures) 
of industrial countries targeted Asian competitors in the first place. 
By contrast, suppliers from Africa were granted trade preferences, e.g. in the 
context of the EU’s agreement with ACP countries. Nonetheless, Africa suffered 
persistent marginalisation in OECD markets for manufactured goods. This contrast 
suggests that local supply conditions were more important than discriminatory trade 
policies of OECD countries for shaping the developing countries’ participation in 
world trade. 
The picture is similar with regard to FDI.  All developing countries hosted one 
third of worldwide FDI stocks in 2000, a rise of more than seven percentage points 
within a decade [UNCTAD (2001)]. However, booming FDI did not benefit all 
developing countries alike:
3 
  • The recent financial crisis notwithstanding, Asia remained the most attractive 
host region for foreign direct investors. 
  • The rising share of Central and Eastern Europe in worldwide FDI flows is 
obviously related to the demise of socialist regimes in this region, the opening 
 
1
The performance of industrial countries in the era of globalisation is not discussed in this paper; 
see Gundlach and Nunnenkamp (1997) on this issue. 
2
For a detailed statistical presentation, see Nunnenkamp (2002). 
3
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up towards world markets and the prospect of accession to the EU. 
  • Latin American countries were concerned that the emergence of Central and 
Eastern Europe as a new competitor for FDI would result in FDI diversion at 
their expense. The evidence suggests otherwise. The observation that Latin 
America regained attractiveness to FDI in the course of the 1990s supports the 
view that new investment opportunities give rise to additional FDI, rather than 
resulting in FDI diversion. 
  • As in trade, Africa’s share in global FDI continued to decline, even though 
average annual FDI flows to Africa almost doubled when comparing 1989–94 
and 1995–2000. 
A widely perceived problem with FDI in developing countries concerns its 
high concentration in a few large and fairly advanced developing economies [e.g. 
UNCTAD (1995); Collins (1998)]. This notion seems to imply that most developing 
countries do not have reasonable chances to attract FDI. However, this concern is 
largely unjustified as it is based on the distribution of FDI in absolute terms. 
The upper panel of Figure 1 lists the 20 top performers among developing 
countries, measured by inward FDI stocks in 1998.
4 This rather small group indeed 
accounted for more than 80 percent of inward FDI stocks in all developing countries. It 
is also true that the group of top performers in absolute terms mainly consists of either 
large countries such as China, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and Argentina, or economies 
with fairly high per-capita income such as Hong Kong and Singapore. This ranking 
provides a distorted picture on developing countries’ attractiveness to FDI. 
Inward FDI stocks have to be considered in relative terms, in order to avoid a 
large-country bias and assess locational attractiveness appropriately. 
The lower panel of Figure 1 relates inward FDI stocks to the host countries’ 
GDP.
5 Caribbean tax havens and developing countries with a population of less than 
three million are excluded from this ranking; both groups include economies with 
extremely high FDI/GDP ratios, which may be due to a few FDI projects in the case of 
very small countries. Even though the sample is reduced in this way, the ranking 
changes significantly  when inward FDI stocks are considered in relative terms.
6 Just 
eight of the 20 top performers in absolute terms are also among the 20 top performers 
in relative terms (see the shaded bars in Figure 1). Moreover, the distribution of inward 
FDI in relative terms is considerably less uneven than the distribution of absolute 
stocks. In conclusion, there is little justification for the pessimistic view, according to 
which just a few developing countries can draw on FDI. 
 
4
In 1998, Pakistan hosted US$ 9.2 billion of FDI stocks and ranked 22nd. 
5By this measure, Pakistan (14.4 percent) was significantly less attractive than Yemen and 
Ecuador (28–30 percent), which represented the tail of the top 20. 
6FDI is largely resource-based in several smaller and less advanced countries with high FDI/GDP 
ratios (e.g., in Azerbaijan, Angola and Zambia). Nevertheless, a fairly heterogeneous set of smaller and 
less advanced countries proved attractive to FDI in relative terms; for details, see Nunnenkamp (2001: 





















































Source: UNCTAD (2000). 
aExcluding Caribbean financial centres. 
bExcluding developing countries with a population of 3 
million and less. Countries with shaded bars belong to the top performers in absolute terms. 
 
Fig. 1.  Inward FDI Stocks: Top 20 Developing Countries
a, 1998 US-$ Billion. 
 
III.  CATCHING UP AND FALLING BACK 
Penetrating OECD markets and attracting FDI are not ends in themselves. 
Rather, the integration of developing countries into global trade and investment 
patterns should be considered a means to spur economic growth. Exports generate 
revenues which may be used to finance urgently needed imports of capital goods. 
These, in turn, tend to increase labour productivity and offer income gains. FDI 
inflows do not only allow for higher investment, but may also provide access to 
internationally available technologies and management know-how. 
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It is here that globalisation critics seem to have an important point. They are 
right in stressing that developing countries which suffered a widening income gap to 
industrial countries outnumber developing countries which narrowed the income 
gap. Nunnenkamp (2002) considers the change in per-capita income (purchasing 
power parity) of developing countries in 1980–2000, relative to the per-capita 
income of the United States, to indicate longer-term processes of catching up and 
falling back. By this measure, the balance of catching up versus falling back is most 
heavily tilted to the latter in Africa, where just two out of 31 countries narrowed the 
income gap to the United States.
7 By contrast, almost all sample countries in Asia 
have caught up economically. While relative income gains remained small in South 
Asian economies, including Pakistan, some East and Southeast Asian economies 
reported substantial gains in relative income. 
The claim of globalisation critics that increasing world-market integration 
went along with widening income disparities between countries is countered by the 
World Bank (2002: 1 f.): “Between countries, globalisation is now mostly reducing 
inequality”.  This conclusion holds once the number of people living in weak and 
strong growth performers among developing countries is taken into account.
8 
Furthermore, globalisation critics tend to ignore that it is one thing to list the large 
number of countries falling back, and a completely different thing to argue that these 
countries were bound to fall back because of globalisation. 
In an earlier paper, we ran some simple correlations in order to get a clue of 
factors that may explain the vastly different growth performance across developing 
countries.
9 Table 1 summarises relevant findings: 
  • First, economic growth was correlated with restructuring of employment and 
production. For example, higher growth was achieved where the employment 
share of agriculture declined more significantly.
10 The correlation becomes 
even stronger when the change in the employment share of agriculture in 1980–
1990 is correlated with the change in per-capita income since 1987 (instead of 
1980). This suggests that restructuring employment was a cause, rather than a 
consequence of higher income growth. 
 
7Likewise, most Latin American countries experienced lower income growth in 1980–2000 than 
the benchmark of industrial countries represented by the United States. In contrast to Africa, however, 
much depends on the period of observation in the case of Latin America. One in two Latin American 
countries outperformed the United States in terms of per-capita income growth in 1987–1995, when 
economic policy reforms gathered momentum in this region [Nunnenkamp (1998)]. 
8According to World Bank (2002), about 3 billion people live in “new globalising” developing 
countries, reporting a considerably higher per-capita income growth than industrial countries in the 1990s. 
On the other hand, developing countries with about 2 billion people have been left out of the process of 
globalisation. 
9For data sources and a detailed discussion of results, see Nunnenkamp (1998a). 
10Note that this correlation turned out to be significant despite growth-reducing effects resulting 
from distortionary government policies. In various developing countries, scarce resources were 
misallocated by (implicit) taxation of agriculture and the corresponding subsidisation of industry [World 
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Table 1 




Change in Per Capita 
Income, Relative to 
the US, 1980–1995 
Change in employment share of agriculture, 1980–1990  –0.52* (74) 
Change in the share of manufactured exports in total 
exports, 1980–1995  0.35* (35) 
Index of export concentration, 1980  –0.33* (70) 
Average share of investment in GDP, 1980-1995  0.55* (57) 
Average years of schooling, 1990  0.43* (62) 
Change in the share of imports in GDP, 1993-1995 
vis-à-vis 1980–1982  0.32* (65) 
Growth of imports of capital goods, 1980–1994  0.74* (38) 
Growth of stocks of foreign direct investment, 1985–1990  0.50* (68) 
Source: Nunnenkamp (1998a). 
aNumber of observations in brackets. * Significant at 5 percent level. 
 
  • Second, an increasing share of manufactured exports in total exports and a 
more diversified export structure went along with higher income growth. 
Additional calculations (in which the income variable was lagged) revealed that 
the restructuring of exports preceded, rather than followed catching up. 
  • Third, growth trends are significantly correlated with factor accumulation, i.e. 
variables which national policy-makers can influence in order to promote 
economic restructuring and productivity gains. The more resources were 
devoted to investment, the higher was per-capita income growth. This applied 
not only to fixed capital formation but also to human capital formation, proxied 
by average years of schooling in Table 1. The latter result is in line with 
findings of Barro (1991) and Mankiw, et al. (1992), according to which 
differences in human capital formation explain a significant part of cross-
country differences in per-capita income. 
  • Finally, the correlations support the view that catching up is easier when 
countries open up towards the world economy [Sachs and Warner (1995)]. All 
three indicators of openness considered in Table 1 are correlated positively 
with income growth.
11 In particular, the calculations underline the relevance of 
 
11One must obviously be careful about drawing conclusions on causality. However, as Peter 
Lindert and Jeffrey Williamson note with reference to the trade-growth link, “the doubts that one can 
retain about each individual study threaten to block our view of the overall forest of evidence. Even 
though no one study can establish that openness to trade has unambiguously helped the representative 
Third World economy, the preponderance of evidence supports this conclusion”. [quoted as in World 
Bank (2002: 5)]. Why Economic Growth Trends Differ  321
capital goods imports and FDI for achieving income gains by drawing on 
internationally available technologies. 
In summary, the correlations support our basic proposition that economic 
restructuring as well as policies encouraging factor accumulation help developing 
countries narrow the income gap to industrial countries. It also turns out that 
globalisation critics are wrong to conclude from the large number of developing 
countries having fallen back that openness to trade and FDI utterly failed to deliver 
income gains. 
 
IV.  ECONOMIC GROWTH, FACTOR ACCUMULATION, AND 
OPENNESS: HOW PAKISTAN COMPARES WITH 
OTHER EMERGING MARKETS 
In this section, we reconsider the empirical nexus between factor 
accumulation, openness and economic growth for a sample of 18 emerging 
economies in Asia, Latin America and Central Europe; the period of observation for 
changes in per-capita income, relative to the United States, is 1985–2000. The reason 
is that various emerging economies have been hit by financial crises since the 1990s. 
These countries are frequently labelled the latest victims of globalisation, a 
conclusion which is shown to be mistaken. Pakistan is included in our sample, 
whenever comparable data are available, in order to provide a clue of some policy 
challenges facing this country. Even though Pakistan was not seriously affected by 
the East Asian crisis, it had to reschedule its foreign debt owed to the Paris Club and 
private bondholders in 1999. 
Growth trends differed tremendously across emerging markets (Figure 2). 
While  per-capita incomes in some Latin American and Central European countries
12 
declined considerably relative to per-capita income in the United States, some Asian 
economies narrowed the income gap by about 20 percentage points. Catching up was 
less impressive in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia than in Korea. Yet the ranking 
in Figure 2 is clearly at odds with the claim that financial crises in these four Asian 
economies have nullified previous gains from globalisation. 
As mentioned before, Pakistan’s growth performance was rather poor, 
particularly by Asian standards. The subsequent evidence does not provide a 
comprehensive explanation; yet it indicates major challenges facing Pakistan: 
  •  In the 1990s, Pakistan reported the lowest investment ratio among the 18 
sample countries [Nunnenkamp (2002), Figure 10]. This is most likely to 
have hindered catching up. Plotting annual average investment ratios against 
 
12The extremely poor performance of The Czech Republic, especially compared to Poland, is due 
to two factors. According to World Bank data on per-capita GNP (in purchasing power parity), the former 
Czechoslovakia suffered a much more serious transition crisis than Poland in the early 1990s. 
Furthermore, per-capita GNP declined in the Czech Republic in the late 1990s. Peter Nunnenkamp  322
the change in per-capita income of our sample countries, Figure 3 reveals a 
clearly positive correlation. The coefficient of the investment variable is 
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Source: World Bank (a). 
aChange in per capita income (PPP), relative to the United States, in 1985–2000 (percentage points). 
 
Fig. 2.  Emerging Markets: Catching Up and Falling Back
a, 1985–2000. 
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Source: World Bank (a).  
aChange in per capita income (PPP), relative to the United States, in 1985–2000 (percentage points). 
bAverage share of gross domestic fixed capital formation in GDP, 1990–1999.  
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  •  Some proxies of human capital formation indicate that Pakistan was far 
down the list in this regard, too.
13 Taking the correlation results of Figure 4 
on average years of schooling (for which strictly comparable data were not 
available in the case of Pakistan) and income growth as a yardstick,
14 
insufficient human capital formation represented a second bottleneck to 
catching up more quickly. 
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Source: World Bank (a); World Economic Forum (2000).  
aChange in per capita income (PPP), relative to the United States, in 1985–2000 (percentage points).  
bRefers to population age 25 and up; Pakistan not included as strictly comparable data on schooling 
were not available. 
Fig. 4. Per Capita Income Growth




For example, public spending on education amounted to 2.8 percent of GNP in Pakistan in 
1995. Among the 18 countries under consideration, only Indonesia and China reported a lower share (1.4 
and 2.3 percent, respectively); the sample average was 3.7 percent. Moreover, Pakistan ranked at the 
bottom by a wide margin with regard to secondary school enrollment (23 percent in 1990, compared to a 
sample average of 60 percent). All data are from World Bank (a). 
14
Similar results were achieved when taking 1990-data on secondary school enrollment (in 
percent of the population of the relevant age group) as the independent variable. The rather poor statistical 
fit of the equation given in Figure 4 (adjusted R²: 0.03) improves considerably when the Czech Republic 
and Hungary are excluded from the regression (adjusted R²: 0.31; coefficient of the schooling variable 
significant at the 2 percent level). Both countries rank fairly high in terms of schooling, while their poor 
growth performance in the period under consideration was largely due to the transition crisis following the 
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  • A third factor impeding a more favourable growth performance of Pakistan 
seems to be related to openness to trade. According to Figure 5, emerging 
economies with relatively low import barriers tend to grow faster than more 
closed economies.
15 Again, Pakistan had to be excluded from this correlation 
exercise, as comparable data were lacking. Yet Pakistan can be classified a 
relatively closed economy according to World Bank data on the significance 
of import duties. In percent of imports, duties were higher only in India (22 
percent) than in Pakistan (19 percent).
16 


























Source: World Bank (a); World Economic Forum (1999).  
aChange in per-capita income (PPP), relative to the United States, in 1985–2000 (percentage points).  
bImport tariffs and quotas; score ranging from 1 (=highest import barriers) to 7 (=lowest import 
barriers); Pakistan not available. 
 
Fig. 5.  Per Capita Income Growth




The level of significance of the openness variable improves from 12 percent to 4 percent, if the 
Czech Republic is excluded from the regression given in Figure 5. 
16
Import duties averaged 7 percent of imports in 15 sample countries (comparable data were not 
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All in all, the evidence leads to three conclusions. First, income gains 
achieved by some emerging economies in the process of globalisation have not been 
erased by recent financial crises. Second, the statistical relations between income 
growth and some of its driving forces, identified in previous research for a larger 
group of developing countries, appear to be validated for emerging economies even 
in times of financial market volatility. Third, Pakistan fits into the general picture, as 
its poor record on factor accumulation and openness went along with a persistently 
large income gap with industrial countries. 
 
V.  SOME UNJUSTIFIED CONCERNS 
Several objections may be raised against the reasoning in the previous 
sections. Two major concerns of globalisation sceptics are discussed in the 
following, namely that foreign indebtedness hinders economic catching up, however 
favourable other growth determinants might be, and that world market integration 
results in greater income inequality within emerging economies. Both concerns are 
of relevance to Pakistan, a low-income country with a high incidence of absolute 
poverty
17 and a significant foreign debt.
18 
Excessive foreign debt may hinder economic growth by providing a 
disincentive to investment.
19 In case of a debt overhang, the present value of 
expected debt-service payments falls short of outstanding foreign debt. The debtor 
country may service its debt fully by increasing investment, but has little incentive to 
do so as the returns to investment will accrue to foreign creditors exclusively. This 
reasoning is underlying the argument that debt relief may benefit not only debtors 
(by adding to their disposable income) but also foreign creditors (by expanding 
overall income to be shared by debtors and creditors). 
The empirical relevance of this reasoning to our sample of emerging 
economies can be assessed by correlating their foreign debt burden with investment 
and income growth. The correlation should be negative, if high foreign debt 
discouraged investment and growth. The foreign debt burden is measured by total 




17According to World Bank (2001: Annex Table 2), almost 85 percent of the population lived on 
less than US$ 2 per day. 
18In World Bank (2000), Pakistan was classified as moderately indebted, which means that the 
present value of debt service exceeded 132 percent of exports or 48 percent of GNP. 
19For a more rigorous analysis, see Corden (1988) as well as Sachs and Huizinga (1987). 
20From this source, data on the present value of external debt is available only since the late 
1990s. Taking 1999-data on this variable results in completely insignificant correlations with both the 
investment ratio and per-capita income growth. However, this procedure does not capture possible effects 
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Disincentive effects of foreign debt appear to be relevant with regard to the 
investment ratio in the 1990s. The adjusted R² of the equation given in Figure 6 is 
0.24, and the coefficient of the debt variable is significant (at 3 percent).
21 Yet, per-
capita income growth was not affected by a higher foreign debt burden; the 
coefficient of the debt variable in Figure 7 is insignificant and the adjusted R² of the 
equation is even negative. Taken together, these results are in some conflict with the 
proposition of a debt overhang in highly indebted emerging economies within our 
sample. It rather seems that productivity increases in countries with a higher debt 
burden and a lower investment ratio were roughly comparable to productivity 
increases in less indebted countries. A possible explanation is that financing 
constraints resulting from a high debt burden have led debtors to cut less productive 
investment in the first place, whereas the debt-overhang proposition would suggest 
otherwise. 




















Source: World Bank (a); World Bank (2000). 
aPercent of GDP; period average for 1990–1999 (Pakistan: 1990–1998). 
bTotal external debt outstanding in 1990 (the Czech Republic: 1992) in percent of gross national 
product; not available for Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Fig. 6.  Gross Fixed Investment
a and Foreign Indebtedness.
b 
 
21The correlation turned out to be somewhat weaker when the debt variable was defined as total 
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Source: World Bank (a); World Bank (2000). 
aChange in per capita income (PPP), relative to the United States, in 1985–2000 (percentage points).  
bTotal external debt outstanding in 1990 (The Czech Republic:1992) in percent of gross national 
product; not available for Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
Fig. 7.  Per Capita Income Growth
a and Foreign Indebtedness.
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There is no convincing evidence either justifying the concern that world-
market integration and the ensuing overall income gains come at the cost of 
increasing income inequality within emerging economies. A substantial body of 
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  • Moser and Ichida (2001) focus on three non-income measures of poverty in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. They find that economic growth was an important factor 
leading to higher life expectancy, declining infant mortality and increasing 
rates of primary school enrollment in 1972–1997. Furthermore, they find no 
evidence that the adoption of structural adjustment programmes has 
increased poverty in this region. 
  • Dollar and Kraay (2000, 2001) analyse the relationships between trade, 
economic growth, poverty and income inequality. According to their 
findings, income of the poor rose one-for-one with overall growth and did 
not fall more than proportionately during economic crises. The authors show 
that a group of “post-1980 globalisers” among developing countries 
outperformed the rich industrial countries in terms of economic growth in the 
1990s, which was in sharp contrast to the rest of the developing world.
23 The 
analysis reveals a strongly positive effect of trade on growth, whereas there 
is little systematic evidence of a relationship between changes in trade 
volumes (or other globalisation measures) and changes in the income share 
of poor segments of the population. The authors conclude that openness to 
foreign trade benefits the poor to the same extent that it benefits the whole 
economy. 
  • The message that trade liberalisation has a positive effect on employment 
and income of the poor is echoed by Bannister and Thugge (2001). It is 
stressed, however, that the links between trade reform and poverty are 
diverse and complex, and that the transitional costs of trade reform may fall 
disproportionately on the poor. Therefore, the authors suggest to mitigate 
transitional costs by carefully designing trade reform, and to implement 
complementary reforms that facilitate the participation of the poor in formal 
markets (e.g. provision of infrastructure, technical assistance, credit and 
training). 
Rather than delving deeper into the analytical links between trade reform, 
economic growth and poverty alleviation, or trying to explain diverse episodes in 
specific countries, we stick to our simple correlation approach to check whether the 
experience across our sample of 18 emerging economies is more in line with the 
research just summarised or with the claims of globalisation critics. We consider the 
Gini index and, where possible, its change over time as a measure of income 
inequality. 
The focus on relative poverty means that absolute poverty may well have 
declined even if openness to trade and economic catching up were associated with 
 
23At the same time, the number of poor people “is falling rapidly in the new globalisers and rising 
in the rest of the developing world” [World Bank (2002: 7)]. Peter Nunnenkamp  330
higher income inequality. However, the correlations suggest that relative poverty 
was not significantly affected by more liberal trade policies and higher overall 
income growth in our sample. The adjusted R
2s of all correlations [reported in more 
detail in Nunnenkamp (2002)] are extremely low (mostly even negative), and the 
coefficients of the trade and growth variables do not meet most generous 
requirements in terms of significance. 
The degree of income inequality differed widely within the sample, 
ranging from a Gini index of about 25 in Hungary and the Czech Republic to 
slightly below 60 in Brazil and Chile.
24 But overall growth trends are unrelated 
to these differences [Nunnenkamp (2002), Figure 17]. The frontrunner in terms 
of catching up, Korea, had a substantially less uneven income distribution than 
the follower Chile. Korea and Pakistan were worlds apart in terms of per-capita 
income growth, but very close in terms of income distribution. A similar 
diversity prevails when openness to imports is plotted against income inequality 
[Nunnenkamp (2002, Figure 18)]. Chile, the most open sample economy 
according to survey results of the World Economic Forum (1999), is 
characterised by a similarly uneven income distribution as Brazil, which is rated 
relatively closed. Korea and Malaysia differ only slightly in terms of openness, 
but significantly in terms of income inequality. 
It is obviously more appropriate to correlate the trade and growth variables 
with the change in income distribution than with the level of the Gini index in a 
specific year. This meets with serious data constraints, however. The (annualised) 
change in the Gini index could be calculated for just 11 of our 18 sample countries, 
based on data for varying time spans given in Dollar and Kraay (2001). The income 
distribution became more even in seven countries (including Pakistan) according to 
this source, whereas the Gini index increased in Hungary, Brazil, Mexico and, most 
steeply, in China. 
Figure 8 reveals that it was mainly in Mexico (and less so in Hungary) where 
openness to imports was associated with increasing income inequality. The case of 
Mexico tends to support the argument of the World Bank (2002: 5), according to 
which rising income inequality observed for Latin American globalisers is “due to 
prior extreme inequalities in educational attainment”.
25 China and Venezuela, which 
were close neighbours in the rating of openness to imports, represented the extremes 
with respect to changes in the Gini index. 
  
 
24A Gini index of zero represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect 
inequality. 
25Note also that Mexico scored very badly within a sample of emerging markets with regard to the 
quality of public schools as well as math and science education [Nunnenkamp (2001b)]. Why Economic Growth Trends Differ  331




Source: Dollar and Kraay (2001); World Economic Forum (1999). 
aAnnualised for varying periods of observation, as reported in Dollar and Kraay (2001: Table 4); 
available from this source only for 11 countries of the sample considered here.  
bImport tariffs and quotas; score ranging from 1 (= highest import barriers) to 7 (= lowest import 
barriers); not available for Pakistan.  
 
Fig. 8.  Change in Income Inequality
a and Openness to Trade.
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In Figure 9, China stands out as the only country in which economic catching 
up to the United States was associated with a widening income inequality within the 
economy. Even the case of China offers at best weak support to the claim of 
globalisation critics. The World Bank (2002: 5) considers the rise in Chinese 
inequality to be “far less problematic”, compared to cases such as Mexico. This is 
because the rise started from a fairly low level of the Gini index (32 in 1980). In the 
late 1990s, income inequality in China (Gini index: 40.3 in 1998) was still slightly 
below the sample average. The World Bank (2002: 5 f.) further notes: “If this 
increase in inequality in China has been the price of growth, it has paid off in terms 
of a massive reduction in poverty.” 
Import tariffs and quotas 
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Source: World Bank (a); Dollar and Kraay (2001).  
aAnnualised for varying periods of observation, as reported in Dollar and Kraay (2001: Table 4); 
available from this source only for 11 countries of the sample considered here. 
bChange in per-capita income (PPP), relative to the United States, in 1985–2000 (percentage points).  
 
Fig. 9.  Change in Income Inequality
a and Per Capita Income Growth.
b 
 
Apart from the interpretation of the Chinese experience, all other episodes of 
catching up in Figure 9 went along with reduced income inequality. At the same 
time, all other countries with increased income inequality failed to catch up 
economically. Hence, the experience of the emerging economies considered here 
does not support the view that growth-promoting policies typically result in rising 
income inequality within countries. This is not to say that participating successfully 
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VI.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical evidence does not support the claim of globalisation critics that 
world-market integration, driven by foreign trade and investment, benefits only the 
rich and is bound to widen income disparities. Developing and newly industrialising 
economies can participate successfully in globalisation and narrow the income gap to 
industrial countries, even though many have failed to do so. The growth performance 
across developing countries is highly diverse, with failures in catching up being 
concentrated in small economies, notably in Africa. Hence, the balance of catching 
up versus falling back shifts to the former, once the number of people living in 
successful globalisers among Third World economies is taken into account. 
Within countries, “globalisation generally reduces poverty because more 
integrated economies tend to grow faster and this growth is usually widely diffused” 
[World Bank (2002: 1)]. Furthermore, world-market integration and overall income 
growth have not, typically, led to greater income inequality within countries. 
The vastly different experience of developing countries with globalisation 
during the last two decades has important policy implications. In contrast to 
widespread concerns, national policy-makers are not rendered powerless by 
globalisation. Economic adjustment and restructuring represents the – frequently 
neglected – link between the globalising environment and the growth performance of 
particular countries. National policy-makers may promote adjustment and 
restructuring by removing bottlenecks to factor accumulation, related to both 
physical and human capital, and by opening up their economies to foreign trade and 
FDI. 
The task of creating a favourable investment climate has various dimensions. 
As the World Bank (2002: 19) notes, “a sound investment climate is not one full of 
tax breaks and subsidies for firms”.  Rather, the challenge is to create an environment 
of good economic governance (including control of corruption, contract enforcement 
and protection of property rights), to meet the demand of firms for business-related 
services (e.g. transport, communication), and to provide for better education and 
training of the labour force. 
More and better education is particularly important for poor segments of the 
population. It is for two reasons that education of the poor should figure high on the 
agenda of national policy-makers. First, it helps economy-wide catching up to more 
advanced countries. Second, broader access to education helps prevent rising income 
inequality within developing countries when they open up towards the world economy. 
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This is a very interesting paper.  It is quite suited for the Iqbal Memorial 
Lecture.  After all, the spirit of Iqbal is truly to developed the economy of this country 
that he had conceived of.  My own image of our National Poet is that of a modern 
learned Muslim comfortable with globalisation.  You only have to read his book The 
Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam to discover his vision of a modern 
Muslim nation that would adopt globalisation and modernity as a path to progress. 
This paper gives answers to the question: Is globalisation an economic steroid 
or a poisoned chalice? The empirical evidence about some developing economies 
that are actively participating in globalisation is presented, showing that openness to 
trade and investment accelerates growth.  It has enabled these countries to gradually 
converge on the rich countries.  Also these converging economies have not had a 
deterioration in income inequality.  Openness clearly has been a force for 
convergence and poverty reduction. Globalisation for this group of countries has 
been  an economic steroid. 
 As a globaliser, I welcome any addition to our knowledge that confirms the 
goodness of international integration.  In this context,  I welcome the conclusions of 
the paper and congratulate the author on confirming Allama Iqbal’s beliefs as well. 
Despite the demonstrated benefits of an open strategy, anti-globalisation 
sentiments have been on the rise.  Violent protests at the IFI meetings clearly 
demonstrates how emotional the globalisation issue has become.  This question, 
therefore, has received a lot of attention from scholars to sort out pertinent issues 
from non-issues.  This paper is an addition to the long list of studies on the topic.  
There are a number of popular bestsellers on the topic as well.  The debate has 
moved well beyond the point that this paper takes us to.  The abundant literature 
documents the persisting global disparities and the lack of convergence in large parts 
of the developing world  population (whole countries or regions within countries) to 
the OECD living standards.  Globalisation has been a poisoned chalice to most 
countries. 
To my mind, the author would have served us well if he had simply 
summarised the current debate on globalisation beyond the self-serving literature put 
forward by the IFIs.  Such a summary would have also allowed his hypethesis of 
globalisation fostering convergence to offer a better set-up. The paper, in my view, 
appears to exist in a kind of vaccum. It misses out on the many theoretical and Comments  337
empirical developments since Barro and Sala–I–Martin’s famous book on 
globalisation. 
I shall try to briefly outline factors explaining why a large part of the world is 
not like the countries that have caught up with the rich countries.  I shall group my 
comments under six main headings: methodology, convergence and geography,   
convergence and institutional and policy differences, fickle  capital flows and 
national policy, the impact of openness within a micro-economic perspective of 
firms  and households and spillovers. 
 (1)  Methodology.  Growth econometrics is now well developed. Barro’s 
lectures on economic growth provide an excellent survey and present 
more interesting graphics than the paper before us.  Sala-I-Martin, in the 
1998 AEA meetings, used an eclectic approach in a paper titled “I Ran 
Four Million Regressions” to attempt to summarise what we know 
about growth.  There is a lot to learn from this literature as to how best 
to summarise the evidence on growth dynamics.  What surprises me is 
that despite the existence of this rich tradition of growth econometrics, 
the author retains a very simply graphical presentation relying largely 
on charts already published by the World Bank and the OECO.  Indeed 
these charts are pretty easy to comprehend but only serve to set up the 
early hypotheses in the growth literature. It is O.K. to start with 
correlations. One needs to carefully sort out the causal connections 
between variables. 
  (2) Convergence, natural geography and ecology. A large and rich 
literature explains the lack of income convergence in the perspective 
of the role of natural geography and ecology.  The geography matters 
because it defines your natural resources base as well as your potential 
for integration with the global economy.  It is interesting to note that 
the vast majority of world output is produced within 100 kilometers of 
the sea or a major river.  Natural openness leads to wealth.  Isolated 
inland regions face major transportation challenges. In addition, 
tropical areas face challenges of disease and agricultural 
sustainability.  This literature powerfully argues against absolute 
convergence—a conclusion that is opposite to the one reached in this 
paper.  It also explains better as to why global inequality has persisted 
for so long.  Once again the literature has moved beyond where this 
paper wishes to take us.  The impression that absolute convergence is 
possible is more a statement of faith than a scientific statement since it 
states the belief that something that has not happened for good reasons 
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  (3)  Convergence, economies of scale, and institutional and policy 
differences.  The implicit model behind the paper assumes that all 
countries have similar institutional framework when in fact institutional 
and policy differences between countries are large.  In view of the 
existence of increasing returns to some important activities, public 
investment can have important and  permanent effects on the location of 
production.  In other words, man-made geography also matters.  In this 
context, one can argue that the Maldives, which has access to the sea but 
suffers from insufficient scale of agglomeration, shall never catch up with 
the USA.  Once again, the literature has moved way beyond where this 
paper wishes to take us. Openness without institutional improvements 
confers little benefits  from globalisation. 
  (4) Fickle capital flows and national policy. Debate on globalisation has 
progressed way beyond this paper’s analysis.  Populists like Tom 
Friedman have extolled the virtues of globalisation in a bestseller  The 
Lexus and the Olive Tree.  In this view, like Santa Clause, Globalisation 
brings costless presents and rewards good behaviour.  But what room 
globalisation has for national policy? Friedman argues that the 
“electronic herd”—the mass of lenders and speculators—who can move 
billion of dollars around the globe in an instant reduces domestic policy 
choices to those between Pepsi and Coke with all other flavours 
banished? Many countries were persuaded by this dictum and began to 
bind themselves to the international economy in the hope of obtaining 
the large inflows that Mr Nunnenkamp also talks about.  None more 
faithfully than Argentina.  Even before the collapse of Argentina, 
scholars like Dani Rodrik, a Turkish professor at Harvard, had already 
begun to argue that fickleness of the “electronic herd” can also easily 
lead to an Argentina or provide the capital for the development of 
Korea. Therein lies the dilemma of globalisation.  And that is the 
debate.  This paper appears to predate that debate.  It simply ignores the 
onset of the Asian Crisis and the factors responsible for this major 
catastrophe.  I would argue that the Rodrik critique of globalisation has 
to be confronted by any serious academic study.  It cannot just be 
wished away or ignored.  Without a solid domestic financial system, 
short-term flows can be highly disruptive.  Policy towards capital 
inflows is a key component of domestic financial regulations.   
Avoidance of crisis also helps in avoiding adverse consequences on 
poverty and social indicators as had happened in East and south Asia in 
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  (5) Openness and micro-economic foundations of a society are crucial in 
analysing the impact of globalisation on firms, industries, households, and 
workers.  To what extent does the competition with transnational 
companies stimulate or  hinder the development of indigenous firms and 
local capacity to learn? Openness may generate more employment and 
wage growth.  It may also lead to higher wages dispersion—that is, a 
higher skill premium for the skilled workers.  One needs to reconcile this 
with the lack of a relationship between openness  and household income 
inequality at the macro level—a relationship that the author had relied on 
to trace the impact of openness on poverty situation.  There is also a lot of 
concern about globalisation and its impact on the environment and the 
quality of life issues—freedom, culture, AIDS, crime, and terrorism.   
There may be no simple link between openness and these issues.  The key 
issue here is again the presence or absence of institutions and policies to 
complement openness. These issues are left un-addressed by the author. 
  (6) The topic of spillovers is another missing area in the paper.  This is 
perhaps the most powerful argument in favour of globalisation that should 
receive a lot more attention that it has.  Helpman and others have shown 
that there are very large learning spillovers from global integration.  The 
importance of the technical change in the developed countries is a 
powerful source of growth for the developing world.   The treatment of 
globalisation in terms of trade and capital flows alone misses out on the 
positive externalities from the knowledge revolution.  In our daily lives 
we have also noticed the impact of spillovers when we use computers and 
internet in the middle of nowhere.  Education is an important area where 
such spillovers impact on a society like Pakistan.  Most of the people in 
this room have had an education spillover from some foreign university 
and all of what I have used here is from the “global knowledge tray”. 
 The speaker here is from Germany to exchange ideas with us and to create a 
globalisation spillover.  I thank him for that and urge him to keep us current with 
knowledge in the West.  The purpose of speakers like him at such forums is to keep 
us current and globalised.  That certainly means participating in today’s debate and 
not yesterday’s debate.  To summarise, the possibility of absolute convergence of 
income levels between the poor and rich countries is remote in view of the 
importance of constraints emerging from natural geography, ecology, and 
endogenous technical change occurring mainly in the developed countries.  Some 
form of conditional convergence as alluded to by the author in the form of rapid and 
effective economic restructuring, including technical adaptation, is a more feasible 
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quickly requires skills in grappling with a correct policy and institutional mix—a 
commodity in short supply in the countries aspiring to catch up with the rich 
countries. 
In closing, I must thank Peter Nunnenkamp for bringing globalisation and 
growth issues on our research and policy agenda.  The unfriendly tone is mint to 
stimulates discussion on the missing areas. 
 
Sarfraz Khan Qureshi 





Let me congratulate Dr Peter Nunnenkamp for writing such a comprehensive 
paper on a very important topic.  In his paper he has covered three broad areas: he 
has responded to the critiques of globalisation with the help of a variety of empirical 
evidence; he has also identified factors that have impeded growth performance in 
Pakistan; and he has dealt with some unjustified concerns quite often expressed in 
the critiques on globalisation.  I shall comment on the these three broad areas. 
 
(i)  Response to the Critiques 
Let me state at the very outset that the process of globalisation is a reality; it is 
here to stay!  It brings opportunities but, at the same time, poses serious challenges to 
the nations. It permits a greater international division of labour and a more efficient 
allocation of resources.  Countries gain access to larger markets, more sophisticated 
technology and a wider variety of goods and services at lower cost.  But 
globalisation also entails risks.  While globalisation enhances rewards of good 
policies, it also accentuates the cost of policy slippages.  Any policy slippage can 
lead to large and destabilising capital flows, heightened exchange rate volatility and 
pressures on the banking system.  Globalisation can bring major benefits to countries 
that can participate effectively in the process.  Countries that fail to participate 
effectively in the process run the risk of being marginalised and left behind. We 
cannot turn back globalisation.  The challenge is to make globalisation an instrument 
of opportunity and inclusion—not of fear and insecurity. 
Peter Nunnenkamp has very strongly defended the process of globalisation by 
providing a variety of empirical evidence.  While I am sympathetic to his  whole 
hearted defense, yet I believe, all is not well for the developing countries in the 
process of globalisation.  While globalisation has increased high level of inter-
dependence, the world is polarised into developed and developing groups with vast 
economic differences.   People in the developed countries enjoy higher per capita 
income and standard of living while developing countries are struggling hard to 
provide minimum basic needs to their population and constantly blaming the unjust 
economic order for their underdevelopment.  They also face numerous problems 
with respect to the access to market, capital flows, overseas employment migration 
of labour, mounting external debt burden, transfer of technology, economic disparity 
and poverty. 
Something  is wrong when the richest 20 percent of the global population 
receives more than 80 percent of the global income.  Something is wrong  when the 
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20.   Something is wrong when 1.2 billion or 1/5th of the humanity still live on less 
than a dollar a day and 2.8 billion or almost half of the humanity still live on less 
than two dollar a day. 
No one can deny the general benefits of the globalisation, but globalisation 
with a human face does require concerted efforts at both the national and 
international levels.  Globalisation must work for all by following the basic 
principles of equity, solidarity, responsibility, participation, and ownership.  We need 
to share the common concerns of the developing countries and make them believe 
that globalisation process is in no way intended to harm them.  There is a growing 
concern in developing countries that the fruits of globalisation are not shared fairly 
and equitably.  These feelings have given birth to many a Seattle.  The concerns of 
the developing countries are, to a larger extent, genuine.   Developing countries need 
better treatment.   Growth and prosperity in developing countries are in the larger 
interest of the developed world itself.  Developing countries would like to see the 
global trading regime to be fairer and equitable. Market access be provided to the 
products of developing countries, particularly for agricultural products, textile, and 
clothing; use of antidumping and countervailing duties be minimised. Developed 
countries must consider reducing debt burden of developing countries through 
various initiatives.  The debt relief must go beyond HIPC initiatives.  It is absolutely 
clear that debt relief without increased market access would be meaningless. 
But at the same time, the developing countries must bring their act together.  
They must put in place a set of complementary policies that are essential for making  
globalisation work in the people’s favour.  In particular, the developing countries 
must pursue sound, coherent, and consistent macroeconomic polices.  These should 
be transparent, stable, and predictable.  They must continue to reform their 
economies to remove structural impediments to their growth and prosperity; improve 
their governance; invest in economic and social infrastructure; strengthen their 
financial sector; continue to pursue trade liberalisation; and participate in 
internationally accepted standards and codes of best practice covering 
macroeconomic policy and data transparency. 
 
(ii)  Why Pakistan Lagged Behind? 
        Dr Nunnenkamp has identified three factors that are responsible for impeding 
growth performance in Pakistan when compared with other Asian countries.  These 
factors are: low investment ratio, poor social indicators, and lack of openness to 
trade.  I believe that these are not the factors but the outcomes of the macroeconomic 
policies we pursued for many years.  We sustained a budget deficit which was twice 
as high as the average of Asian developing countries for a long  period of time.  We 
also sustained large current account deficit, again for a long time.  The natural 
outcome of such policies is the higher and faster accumulation of public debt.  As 
such, investment is bound to be lower, growth would be lower as well, poverty Comments  343
would rise, and social indicators would be poor.  As far as openness is concerned, 
along with Pakistan, the international environment is also responsible for the lack of 
openness. 
     
(iii)  Some Unjustified Comments  
There is a general perception that excessive foreign debt may hinder economic 
growth by providing a disincentive to investment.  The empirical evidence provided 
by Peter Nunnenkamp does not support the general perception.  While he finds 
negative correlation between external debt and investment, he finds no evidence of 
negative correlation between debt and per capita income growth.  In the case of the 
former, he correlates Debt/GNP ratio with Investment/GNP ratio, but in the case of 
latter, he correlates Debt/GNP with growth of per capita income, but no significant 
relation between the two variables was found.  I think he might get conclusive 
evidence if he correlated debt/GNP ratio with per capita income and not its growth. 
He may get a negative and significant correlation. 
Lastly, Peter Nunnenkamp has found no convincing evidence justifying the 
concern that world market integration would increase income inequality within   
emerging economies.  I believe that world market integration will increase income 
equality within emerging economies because overall income gains will depend on 
how effectively each economy is participating in the process of globalisation.  To the 
extent that their level of preparedness and level of effective participation differ, the 
income gains would differ as well, and income inequality would be higher. 
I have taken enough time to respond to a very comprehensive paper. I have 
enjoyed reading the paper, and we should all be grateful to the author for presenting 
and excellent paper on a very important topic. 
 
Ashfaque H. Khan 
Ministry of  Finance, 
Islamabad. 